Amazon Aggregator: What They Are, How They Work, and What the Market Looks Like in 2026

For a few years, a particular kind of email arrived in FBA sellers' inboxes with unusual regularity. The subject line was usually something like "Interested in acquiring your Amazon business," and the body described a company: often backed by institutional capital, often with a senior team drawn from consulting or investment banking, that had reviewed the seller's listing and thought there might be a fit.

Some sellers ignored them. Some replied out of curiosity. A meaningful number ended up in due diligence processes that moved surprisingly fast, with term sheets that included numbers the sellers had genuinely not expected. More than 90 Amazon-focused aggregators emerged during the 2020–2022 boom and collectively raised billions of dollars in equity and debt financing. If the $7.93 billion figure is retained, cite the exact Tracxn dataset and clarify whether it represents equity funding only or total funding.

Then the market changed significantly, and the story of Amazon aggregators became considerably more complicated. Thrasio, the company that had become the defining name in the category, filed for Chapter 11 in February 2024. Perch went through multiple restructuring rounds before merging with Razor Group. The multiples sellers that had been offered in 2021 disappeared. According to Tracxn (January 2026), 57 active aggregators remained in the market. However, the count depends on Tracxn's definition of an active aggregator (Tracxn, January 2026): down from a peak of more than 90, with a substantially different set of deal terms, buyer expectations, and market realities than existed three years earlier.

What an Amazon Aggregator Actually Is

The Acquisition and Scale Model in Plain Terms

An Amazon aggregator is a company that buys Amazon FBA brands: typically from individual sellers or small teams who built a product, grew it to meaningful revenue, and now want to exit, and then scales those brands using shared operational resources that no individual seller could justify building on their own.

The shared resources are the core of the model. A single seller running a $2 million FBA business cannot afford a full-time PPC specialist, a supply chain team, a listing optimisation expert, a data analytics team, and a brand development function simultaneously. An aggregator running 30 or 50 brands across a portfolio can afford all of those things centrally and then deploy them across every brand in the portfolio. The per-brand cost of those capabilities is dramatically lower at scale than it is for an individual seller, and the productivity, applied consistently, should compound into meaningfully higher revenue per brand than the original seller was generating.

Where Aggregators Look for Value

The value aggregators typically target acquired brands falls into a few consistent categories:

• PPC inefficiency: a brand spending $20,000 a month on Amazon ads with an unstructured campaign architecture is leaving significant margin on the table. Experienced PPC teams can often improve advertising efficiency during the first few months following an acquisition, although results vary by brand.

• Listing quality gaps: many successful FBA sellers built products that work well despite imperfect listings: images that could be stronger, copy that could be sharper, A+ content that hasn't been maximised. Professional listing optimisation can improve conversion performance, although results vary depending on the starting quality of the listing and the product category.

• International expansion: a brand doing well on Amazon US often has untapped potential on Amazon UK, DE, or JP that the original seller never pursued. Aggregators often have operational capabilities that make international expansion more efficient than it would be for many individual sellers.

• Supply chain consolidation: aggregators can often negotiate better manufacturer pricing and shipping terms across a consolidated portfolio than individual sellers can for a single brand.
  
  

How the Amazon Aggregator Model Was Supposed to Work

The Original Thesis: Buy, Centralise, Scale

The thesis was straightforward enough to be compelling and complicated enough to fail in interesting ways. The basic version: acquire Amazon FBA brands at 3 to 4 times seller discretionary earnings (SDE: the seller's profit after removing their salary and any non-recurring expenses), plug them into a shared operational platform, and over 3-5 years grow the portfolio value to a point where it can be sold to private equity or taken public at a meaningful premium.

SDE multiples in the 3-4x range made the math look attractive. A brand generating $500,000 SDE could be acquired for $1.5 to $2 million. If shared operations lifted that SDE to $750,000 over two years: through better PPC management, improved conversion rates, and international expansion, the same brand would be worth $2.25 to $3 million at the same multiple. The operations team is shared across 40 brands, so the incremental cost of the improvement is low. Repeat 40 times, and a $60 million portfolio becomes a $120 million portfolio without adding new acquisitions.

Why 2020 and 2021 Felt Like a Gold Rush

The pandemic accelerated everything. E-commerce grew at rates that had been projected for 2025-2028. Amazon FBA revenue for sellers across many categories spiked. The number of profitable, scalable FBA brands on the market increased dramatically, and a wave of institutional capital, much of it from venture firms and hedge funds that had never previously considered e-commerce roll-up strategies, arrived to back the aggregators pursuing them.

Competition between aggregators for the same brands drove multiples up. A brand that might have sold for 3x SDE in 2019 was attracting offers at 5x, 6x, or 7x SDE by mid-2021. Aggregators raised more capital to stay competitive. More capital meant more pressure to deploy it into acquisitions. More acquisitions at higher multiples meant a portfolio that could only generate its expected returns if 2021 e-commerce growth rates continued indefinitely.

What Happened After 2022: The Market Correction

Multiple Inflation and the Pricing Problem

The thesis broke for a specific, traceable reason: entry prices at 2021 multiples only worked if pandemic-era growth continued. When e-commerce growth normalised in 2022, as consumers returned to physical stores, spent money on travel, and reduced the accelerated home-goods purchasing of the pandemic period, the brands inside aggregator portfolios began underperforming their acquisition projections. Simultaneously, Amazon increased various FBA, fulfilment, referral, storage, and fuel-related fees during this period, compressing margins further. And interest rates rose sharply, increasing the cost of the debt that had financed many of the acquisition packages.

An aggregator that had paid 6x SDE for a brand in mid-2021 now held an asset that was generating less revenue than projected, at a higher operating cost, financed by more expensive debt. The operations playbook: PPC improvement, listing optimisation, and international expansion, was still executable, but it couldn't generate returns sufficient to justify the entry price when all three headwinds arrived simultaneously.

Thrasio, Perch, Razor Group, and the Restructuring Wave

The consequences played out across the major aggregators at different speeds and with different outcomes.

The Aggregator Landscape in January 2026

According to Tracxn (January 2026), 57 active aggregators remained in the market, although the count depends on Tracxn's definition of an active aggregator (Tracxn, January 2026), down from a peak of more than 90. The consolidation has been significant: several aggregators filed for bankruptcy, several merged with larger competitors, and several quietly stopped making new acquisitions while working through existing portfolio challenges.

The aggregators that remain active are operating with considerably more discipline than their 2021 counterparts. Acquisition criteria are stricter. Due diligence is more thorough. Entry multiples are lower. Deal structures have shifted materially toward protecting the buyer rather than maximising the seller's upfront payment.

What the Amazon Aggregator Market Looks Like in 2026

Active Players and Current Deal Activity

The active aggregator universe in 2026 is smaller, more selective, and concentrated among a subset of players who survived the restructuring period with operational discipline intact. Razor Group has emerged as one of the most globally active acquirers, having absorbed both Perch and Infinite Commerce. Thrasio continues operating post-restructuring with a narrowed focus on brands with strong repeat-purchase economics. Heroes and Berlin Brands Group remain active at a more selective pace. A small number of vertically focused or regionally focused aggregators also continue making deals.

How Valuations and Deal Structures Have Changed

The Brands Aggregators Are Still Buying

The active aggregators in 2026 have specific, consistent criteria that have tightened considerably from the more permissive 2021 standards. The profile they are actively targeting:

• Revenue spread across multiple ASINs: single-product businesses command steep discounts because concentration risk is the primary post-acquisition vulnerability.

• Consistent month-over-month revenue with no unexplained spikes: pandemic-era revenue anomalies that never repeated have become a significant due diligence concern.

• Clean review profile and history: evidence of review manipulation or significant Amazon policy violations is considered a major due diligence risk and may prevent a transaction.

• No unresolved IP disputes or counterfeit history: clean Amazon account standing is a baseline requirement.

• Supplier diversity: Brands dependent on a single supplier face meaningful valuation discounts because the supply chain risk is unacceptable to a buyer intending to operate the brand for 3-5 years.